Bloody Roads South: The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-7, 1864 – The South's Last Chance

Bloody Roads South: The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-7, 1864 – The South's Last Chance Rulebook

Table of Contents

1.0 Terrain and Map Notes
2.0 General Special Rules
3.0 Union Special Rules
4.0 Confederate Special Rules
5.0 Victory Conditions
6.0 Scenario Set Up Notes
7.0 Scenarios
Player’s Notes
Designer’s Notes
Historical Notes
Personality Sheets

1.0 Terrain and Map Notes

1.1 Trails

These are low quality roadways that account for most of the road network in the Wilderness. Trails have their own effect on movement as noted on the Terrain Effects on Movement Table.

1.2 The Wilderness

The Wilderness was no ordinary forest, but a tangled jungle of second-growth timber with hidden ravines and swamps, a great deal of underbrush, and virtually no visibility. In this game, hexes which would normally be considered forest are considered “Wilderness” and are subject to the following rules. Note that several of these rules affect the Union side more than the Confederate, because as a whole, the larger Union units had a more difficult time in the Wilderness. NOTE: Rules marked OPTIONAL should only be used by players who find that the Union wins too easily, or who want to shift the game’s balance toward the Confederates.

1.2a Important: Like any other terrain, the Wilderness hexes’s movement point terrain effects are negated when units move using a road, trail or railroad feature.

Also, it should be noted that all Wilderness effects (other than MP costs) are negated in road, trail or railroad hexes regardless of the formation of the unit. This rule negates all of the Wilderness special rules if true. The Unfinished Railroad only counts for this rule if it has been found. (see 1.3)

1.2b OPTIONAL: Only when stacked with a leader do Union Shaken and Disorganized units automatically improve their morale state during the Rally Phase. Units without leaders must roll a 1 or 2 on one die (as if they were Routed) to improve their morale state. Routed units are handled normally.

1.2c Any time a Union unit enters a Wilderness hex it automatically becomes Shaken. There is no additional effect for entering more than one hex and if the unit is already in a morale state other than Normal, this Shaken result is of no effect. This effect is applied at the instant of entry into the hex.

1.2d Terrain costs for Wilderness hexes are listed on the Special Terrain Effects and Special Rule Summary on the game map. (Map B)

1.2e Accidental Flank Fire. Often, units in the Wilderness would unwittingly face their flank to the enemy. Any time a Shaken or Disorganized unit is fired upon in the Wilderness and the Fire Table roll is a 2 or 10, the fire is resolved as if it were a flank fire in addition to any other applicable modifications. The flank target shifts on the Fire, Straggler and Morale Tables are made. When a fire combat is determined to be an Accidental Flank Fire, shift from the current column according to the column shift for a flank target and use the original dice roll to determine the result. For Example: A combat is being resolved on the 3-4 column and the player rolls a 10. The combat is shifted to the 7-8 column and is resolved with the 10 roll. Note that this same effect may occur in Close Combat.

1.2f Stragglers may not be recovered in Wilderness hexes.

1.2g Units forced to retreat in the Wilderness must do so along road, railroad or trail features if these are available. Note that retreat “along” means that the direction of the retreat is at first toward the feature and then along it as determined by local circumstances.

1.2h If a unit (of either side) moves into a Wilderness hex at Night it is automatically Disorganized (1.2c is not used at night.) Note that a unit which is DG and gets another DG (by moving into a second hex, for example) becomes Routed. The effect is applied on the instant of entry into the hex. Design Note: If players feel that this rule essentially prevents them from moving troops at night except along roads, etc., then they have correctly grasped its intent.

1.2i OPTIONAL: Shaken units in the Wilderness have their fire points x1/2, Disorganized units have theirs x 1/4.

1.3 The Unfinished Railroad

This was the raised and somewhat cleared roadbed of a railroad projected to connect Fredericksburg with the Orange Courthouse area. On May 6th, Longstreet used it as a road to reach the Federal flank. All accounts indicate that neither side was aware of its existence prior to the battle, and the Confederates only became aware of it when Longstreet’s troops crossed over it when marching to the battle.

1.3a Neither side may use the Unfinished Railroad as a trail until it is discovered.

1.3b The requirements for discovery are listed on the Special Terrain Effects and Special Rule Summary on Map B.

1.3c A discovery roll is made once per turn after the conditions have been met at the very beginning of a side’s Movement and Close Combat Phase. The roll is made on two dice.

1.3d Discovery comes for the Confederates on a roll of 2-4, for the Union on a 2. All other results are of no effect.

1.3e Once discovered, the Unfinished Railroad may be used as a trail by the side which discovered it. The other side may continue to try to discover it at that time.

1.3f The Unfinished Railroad is considered undiscovered at the beginning of every scenario except number 7. In Scenario 7, both sides are considered to be aware of the Unfinished Railroad.

1.4 The Rapidan River

Should either player ever get the urge to cross this river, he may do so only at the ford. The movement point cost for such a movement is marked on the map and is the same for all unit types and formations which are otherwise able to move.

Map Errata

After printing, it was discovered that two hexes of Map B were classed with the wrong elevations. These are B17.35 and B18.35. Both should be Level 3, not Level 4. The corresponding hexes on Map A are correct. Germanna Plank Road: The “Plank Road” which passes through hex A33.15 is the Germanna Plank Road. The name “Germanna” was inadvertently left off the map. In the Special Terrain Effects and Special Rule Summary on Map B, the hex listed for the Union to move through so as to be able to find the Unfinished Railroad is incorrect. It should be B39.06, not B40.06.

2.0 General Special Rules

2.1 Artillery Ammunition

Artillery ammunition for both sides is unlimited. Due to the limited amount of artillery firing because of terrain, even normal amounts of ammunition could last much longer than usually. And record keeping of this was found to be a useless exercise.

2.2 Brigade Reassignment

On several occasions during the battle, both sides reassigned brigades from one division to another. This can be done in the game, given the following restrictions.

2.2a The two divisions must be of the same corps.

2.2b A single division may, at any given time, have either one its original brigades detached or have a single brigade attached to it from another division—but never more or both.

2.2c Reassignment requires an order (issued from the army commander or from a corps commander’s initiative) to the originally owning division commander.

2.2d Brigades may not be detached to serve by themselves—they must be attached to some division.

2.2e Wrecked brigades may not be reassigned, wrecked divisions cannot engage in reassignment. If a brigade becomes wrecked while reassigned, its reassignment is terminated and it must move back to its original division (if outside command radii.)

2.2f A division of only two brigades cannot detach a brigade.

2.2g No adjustment is made to wrecked levels of divisions because of reassignment. A reassigned brigade that becomes wrecked marks off a box on its original parent division’s wrecked chart. While reassigned, if a brigade becomes wrecked, it must check morale as a wrecked brigade of a wrecked division until it is back within normal command radii of its original parent division.

2.3 Brigade Goals

Brigades which have a B morale or better which are not routed may be given brigade goals in the same manner as divisional goals are given. Follow the same procedure as divisional goals and assign the brigade its instructions.

2.4 Breastworks

Since the major issue in breastwork construction in the Wilderness was one of cutting a field of fire and of piling the cut brush with earth, the following can be used with a minimal amount of fuss and can generate reasonable results. Any hex containing an unlimbered artillery unit is considered to be breastworks (as defined in the optional rule) and is protected as such through its frontal hexsides. Note that the accidental flank fire rule may negate protection if flank fire is found to have occurred. There is no restriction on facing change. Alternately, this game may be played with the optional Breastworks rules in the Series rulebook. Players who decide to use those rules are forewarned that they will need to create their own breastworks markers or steal them from other games. The choice is yours.

3.0 Union Special Rules

Terms: Army of the Potomac and Units thereof: Units belonging directly to the Army of the Potomac, 2nd Corps, 5th Corps, and 6th Corps. Not part of the Army of the Potomac: The 9th Corps.

3.1 Union Command and Control

3.1a Grant, Meade, and Burnside. The Union command arrangement at the beginning of this campaign is very unusual. Burnside, commanding the 9th Corps, actually ranks Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac and cannot be issued orders by Meade. Furthermore, U.S. Grant, general-in-chief of all armies, is travelling with the army. Make no mistake, the player is Grant. Grant may issue orders directly to Burnside, Meade, or any Army of the Potomac Corps commander. Grant may send an order to Meade, who (using his own command points) may issue the order to one or more Army of the Potomac corps commanders. Meade may not issue orders to Burnside. If Grant is stacked with Meade,

Grant’s orders are instantly accepted by Meade on the turn they are given. On the next turn, Meade may recopy and issue the same orders to one or more Army of the Potomac Corps commanders. Meade may only issue orders on his own (without Grant sending him one) if both Grant and Burnside have become casualties. Example: Grant Sending Orders To Burnside: Bring 9th Corps forward to Spottswood’s Clearing and await further instructions. To Meade: Order Warren and Sedgwick to attack the enemy force along the Orange Turnpike. To Hancock: Bring 2nd Corps to the Brock Road/ Plank Road crossing and attack down the Plank Road. Once these orders have been accepted, Burnside and Hancock may immediately respond. Meade, however, must issue orders of his own to Warren and Sedgwick in the next orders writing phase. These orders (from Meade) must then be separately checked for acceptance upon arrival at their respective destinations.

3.1b Orders from Grant Directly to Army of the Potomac Corps Commanders. While Grant may bypass Meade and issue orders to these men directly, any order directly from Grant to a corps commander (other than Burnside) receives a one column shift to the left on the Acceptance Table (in addition to any other shift which may apply.)

3.1c Burnside and the Army. If Meade becomes a casualty, Burnside takes over as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Unlike Meade, he must accept orders from Grant in the normal manner and Grant may no longer issue orders directly to the corps commanders. He must use Burnside. The moral is, don’t get Meade hurt...

3.1c Divisional Attack Stoppage. During the Wilderness campaign the Army of the Potomac was operating with very large corps—much larger than before. All Union Divisions must check for Attack Stoppage separately. The standard Corps Attack Stoppage Table is used with each occurrence of the word “corps” being replaced with “division,” and each occurrence of the word “division” being replaced by “brigade.” In other words, a four brigade division with a single wrecked brigade will roll for attack stoppage just as a four division corps with a wrecked division. If a division fails an attack stoppage roll, then it no longer has any orders. On the turn of the attack stoppage roll, the division must withdraw out of small arms range (2 hexes, regardless of LOS.) It may then defend in place but its brigades may not, themselves, move adjacent to enemy units—they may, however, stay in place if enemy units move adjacent to them. Union Corps no longer need to check for acceptance themselves—such checks have been replaced with the division checks above. A corps is deemed to have lost its attack orders when every division has stopped attacking. Divisions which have stopped attacking may be “restarted” by successful initiative on the part of their own or the corps commander (note the restrictions on who can give “attack” orders in 3.1f and 3.1g below.)

3.1d Attack Stoppage Penalties. The following shifts are applied to Attack Stoppage rolls made by divisions within the listed commands: 2 Corps: No penalty 5, 6 and 9 Corps: One column shift right (a column 3 becomes a 4, etc.)

3.1e Anti-Initiatives. There are no Union anti-initiatives.

3.1f Corps Commander Restrictions. Only Hancock may use initiative to give himself “attack” orders, an attack order being any order which could be considered complex. Other Union corps commanders may use initiative to give “simple” orders, except, that is... Burnside may never use initiative in any way other than to attempt to release himself from his movement restrictions (3.3a.)

3.1g Division Commander Restrictions. Only the following division commanders may use initiative (those that may use it, may give themselves “attack” orders): Gibbon, Barlow, Griffin, Wadsworth, Wright, and Getty.

3.2 Hancock

Winfield Hancock, commanding the 2nd Corps, was still suffering from a severe wound received at Gettysburg the year before. He is confined to an ambulance and moves as a Limbered Artillery unit. His counter is marked as an ambulance to remind players of this. Hancock was the best corps commander in the Army of the Potomac at this time and as such was he was trusted and relied upon by Grant and Meade. For this reason, up to three additional divisions may be assigned to the 2nd Corps (detached from their original corps by orders from Grant or Meade) at any one time. Note that if Hancock becomes a casualty, this bonus is lost and the Union player must decide which one additional division (at most) he wants to stay with the 2nd Corps, others (if any) must return to their original corps.

3.3 Burnside and the 9th Corps

On May 5th, Burnside’s 9th Corps more or less remained out of the fighting because of concerns about the security of the river crossing and the large Union trains. For this reason, and because Burnside was such a special customer, the following rules are required. When using the Army Status rules, Burnside and the 9th Corps must keep track of status separately from the rest of the army. Lee may make panic demands of Burnside. (Optional: Players who feel Burn deserves special slamming or wish to use him to further off-set the Union numerical advantage may use the following: Burnside’s status viewpoint is always negative, regardless of circumstances.)

3.3a Ninth Corps Restrictions. The 9th Corps may not move further south along the Germanna Plank Road than Spottswood’s Clearing nor may they move further than one hex west of the Germanna Plank Road until one or more of the following conditions is met: 1. A Confederate unit moves to or within two hexes of a 9th Corps unit. 2. At 10:00pm 5 May, or 3. If Burnside successfully obtains initiative (an exception to the restriction below.) In any of these three cases, 9th Corps is simply released from this movement restriction. Actual orders must still be issued and accepted before anything happens. Grant may not issue orders to 9th Corps until it is released—he may never issue orders “ahead of time” so that they are accepted or delivered when release occurs. Burnside may not use initiative (with the exception of trying to repeal the movement restriction.) Even in this latter case, Burnside may not give himself orders, he may only repeal the movement restriction. Grant may never give orders to Burnside in an “in-person, verbal” manner, even if stacked with him. All orders from Grant to Burnside must be sent by an aide. Meade may never send orders to Burnside. All orders for which Burnside is attempting to accept on the Acceptance Table automatically receive a one column shift to the left (in addition to any other shifts that might apply.)

3.3b Ninth Corps Provisional Brigade. This brigade may be attached to any 9th Corps division. It may be reassigned during any Command Phase in which

Burnside stacks with it. The number of brigades required to wreck the assigned division is unaffected. The brigade does not contribute to the wrecking of any division. This brigade, if wrecked, makes morale checks as if it were a wrecked brigade of a wrecked division, regardless of the status of its “parent” division.

3.3c 4th Division, 9th Corps. This is the first division of Black troops to serve in the Virginia theater. Because of political ramifications, this division was kept out of the fighting until the Crater disaster in July. Because they are very green, they are given morales of “E.” But, to reflect their special stake in the fighting, they check for and recover stragglers as “A’s.” Their wrecked level has been computed as if they were “A” units. Except for straggler functions, they are “E” rated units. These units are only used if the variant containing them is also used.

3.4 Kitching’s Heavy Artillery Brigade

This brigade may be assigned to any Army of the Potomac division by order from Grant to Meade. The number of brigades required to wreck the assigned division is unaffected. The brigade does not contribute to the wrecking of any division. This brigade, if wrecked, makes morale checks as if it were a wrecked brigade of a wrecked division, regardless of the status of its “parent” division.

3.5 The Engineer Regiment

Grant insisted that everyone should shoulder a musket. So, on the morning of May 6th, he had Meade put his engineer unit into the line as infantry. This brigade may be assigned to any Army of the Potomac division by order from Grant to Meade. The number of brigades required to wreck the assigned division is unaffected. The brigade does not contribute to the wrecking of any division. This brigade, if wrecked, makes morale checks as if it were a wrecked brigade of a wrecked division, regardless of the status of its “parent” division.

3.6 The Army of the Potomac “Reserve” (Optional)

At several points in the fighting, Union formations were pulled out of the fighting and placed in reserve near the Lacey House. While never formally established as such, these units constituted a kind of reserve pool which Meade held ready for emergencies. By order from Grant to Meade, the Union player may release up to three divisions from the Army of the Potomac to form an “Army of the Potomac Reserve.” These divisions then use the A Pot HQ as their corps HQ (command radius and all) until the Union player decides he wants to use them. At that time, by an order from Grant, or Meade, they are given divisional goals to fulfill. If the A Pot HQ has divisions assigned to it, it cannot move without orders (just like a normal corps HQ), except that it may not be given complex orders. In other words, the army HQ acts as a corps HQ for these units (for storage until they are needed), but it cannot start using the Reserve as a corps.

3.7 The Army of the Potomac Supply Train

The Union Army Trains never actually entered onto the game map. They were parked at Chancellorsville throughout the battle. To resupply a Union corps supply wagon (including the 9th Corps), the wagon must spend an entire game turn in hex B51.25 (in the scenarios which use only Map A, use hex A49.01.) A Supply train counter is provided for your use so as to mark the location just off-map where the trains are supposed to be so that this rule need not be referenced during play.

3.8 Union Minor Variants

3.8a Ferraro Joins the Fight. Ferraro’s 4th Division, 9th Corps, composed entirely of black regiments, was held out of the fighting. They did enter the gamemap on May 6th, but were ordered to Chancellorsville to guard the trains that evening. This variant allows the Union player to have them enter the map (along with 5 Gun Points of 9th Corps Artillery) anytime after 6:00am on May 6th (exclusive.) They must enter at Entry Hex D, Map B and have orders to report to the 9th Corps HQ and join the corps. This option costs the Union player 2 victory points. If this option is being used, it is kept secret until these troops enter the map. In sceanrio 7, 4/9 would be set up w/i 3 hexes of the 9th Corps HQ if this variant is used.

3.8b Burnside goes elsewhere. There was some thought given to sending Burnside and the 9th Corps to some other theater of war. Under this variant, the entire 9th Corps is deleted from the Union Order of Battle (to include Burnside, his special rules and considerations, and 4/9 above.) The Union player is given an additional 5 victory points if this option is used. Note that use of this option should be announced to the Confederate player before the game begins—it is not kept secret as are the others.

4.0 Confederate Special Rules

4.1 Confederate Command and Control

4.1a Anti-Initiatives. There are no Confederate Anti-Initiatives.

4.1b Corps Commander Restrictions. All Confederate corps commanders may use initiative to give themselves any type of orders.

4.1c Division Commander Restrictions. All Confederate division commanders may use initiative to obtain orders except for Field (who may not use initiative.)

4.1d Lee as Corps Commander. The Confederate player has the option of using R.E. Lee to replace a corps commander who becomes wounded or is killed. If the player decides to do so, no other replacement is made for the corps commander and Lee assumes the corps leader’s duties. Lee treats himself as any other corps commander: he must issue himself orders (all of which are in-person verbal, of course) and must touch base at “his” corps HQ to implement accepted orders. Lee may use initiative in his corps capacity (if he gets a loose cannon result, it is only applied to his corps, not the whole army.)

4.2 Off-Map Movement

The Confederate player may move units units off-map between Map A and Map B. Such movement may only be done between A1.01 and B1.21. The Union player may never move units off-map in this manner and combat never takes place between units off-map and those on-map. Note that if units find the hex which they must exit or enter off-map movement to be blocked by enemy units or EZOC’s, they may enter or exit the off-map movement cycle in any map edge hex at or within 10 hexes of those listed above. Time required to execute this movement is given below based on unit type.

4.2a Infantry in Column and Artillery. 3 turns.

4.2b Wagons and Trains. 4 turns.

4.2c Leaders and Orders. 2 turns. Example: Time Calculation in Off-Map Movement. An infantry unit in column exits the map at hex A1.01 at 10:00am. It would appear at hex B1.21 at the beginning of the Movement and Close Combat Phase in the 11:30am turn. A leader exist hex B1.21 at 1:00am (a night turn) and will appear at A1.01 at 3:00am.

4.3 Variable Reinforcement Entry

The Confederate reinforcements which arrived early on May 6th could have entered in a number of different locations based on the situation at the time. The Confederate player must determine where they are to enter by 11:00pm May 5th. The location must be written on a scrap of paper which is to be shown to the Union player on the turn of entry. The selected hex may be changed at any time through 11:00pm May 5th—but after that turn the location cannot be changed.

4.3a Orders. Like the location of entry, the orders assigned to Longstreet and Anderson may be changed at any time up to and including the 11:00pm turn May 5th. These orders may not be checked for acceptance until the turn before the units are to enter the map. The following orders are in effect until such time as different, playerwritten orders are accepted and implemented: Anderson is to move to rejoin his corps and Longstreet’s Corps is to move to the Army HQ and await orders.

4.3b Available Hexes: For Anderson’s Division, J/R/2, and R/R/2: A1.30, A1.22, A1.10, A1.01, and/or B1.21. For Longstreet’s Corps: A1.10, A1.01, B1.20, and/or B1.21. Note that Longstreet’s arrival is delayed 3 turns if A1.10 or A1.01 is selected.

4.4 The 1st NC Cavalry

On May 5th, a single Confederate cavalry regiment (1st NC Cav) played a pivotal role in delaying the Union advance. This action greatly contributed to the Federal failure to crush Ewell early in the battle. While necessarily abstract, this action is simulated by the following.

4.4a The 1st NC Cav (a counter) has no combat, movement ability or morale. It cannot engage in any form of combat nor suffer from combat. Its only function is to block the Culpepper Mine Road.

4.4b The 1st NC Cav exerts a ZOC into all six adjacent hexes. Union units must stop if they enter any of these ZOC hexes. Close Combat with the 1st NC is not allowed.

4.4c If at the beginning of any Confederate Player Turn, one or more Union units is adjacent to the 1st NC, roll two dice on the 1st NC Cav Table printed on Map B. The result is the number of hexes the 1st NC must retreat along the Culpepper Mine Road. This retreat is completely unaffected by Union units or their ZOC’s. Should a Union unit manage to occupy the hex the 1st NC is required to retreat to, the Union unit is removed from the hex, the 1st NC is placed into it, and the Union unit is placed into a hex adjacent to the 1st NC which is on the road and further east than the cavalry. In other words, the retreat of the 1st NC cannot be interfered with by Union units.

4.4d The 1st NC Cav is removed from play if it retreats to or past the junction between the Culpepper Mine Road and the Orange Turnpike, or if a Confederate unit moves adjacent to it.

4.5 Confederate Minor Variants

4.5a Pickett joins Longstreet. Pickett’s Division spent the early part of May helping to save Richmond from Ben Butler’s Army of the James. However, the Federal high command expected Pickett to show up in the Wilderness. If Pickett is included in the Confederate Order of Battle, he may arrive with the rest of 1st Corps or he may arrive at Entry Hex F or hex B29.01 two turns after the rest of 1st Corps arrives (Confederate player’s choice.) Or, if 1st Corps is already on the map, P/1 sets up w/ i 3 hexes of the 1st Corps HQ. This option costs the Confederate player 1 victory point. If this option is being used, it is kept secret until these troops enter the map.

4.5b Longstreet moves further East. Longstreet could have continued further east along the Catharpin Road before turning north to the Plank Road. Had he done so, he would have entered the game map 2 turns later, but at Entry Hex F or hex B29.01. The Confederate player may decide to use this option at any time on or before 11:00pm May 5th. To do so, write the selected entry hex (only one of the two may be used at a time) on a scrap of paper, adjust Longstreet’s entry time, and on the turn of entry show the Union player the scrap of paper. Use of this option gives the Union player 4 victory points. Use of this option is highly recommended. If this option is being used, it is kept secret until these troops enter the map.

4.5c Anderson moves with Hill. Anderson’s Division of 3rd Corps was left behind to guard the fords west of the Germanna Plank Road. Under this option, Anderson and his division sets up w/i 3 hexes of the 3 Corps HQ and the Union player is given 2 victory points. If this option is being used, it is kept secret until these troops enter the map.

5.0 Victory Conditions

Note that the three single map scenarios have their own victory conditions. The following is only used for Scenarios 4 through 7. Judging victory in the battle of the Wilderness is very difficult. In a very real sense, both sides won: Grant because he was able to keep moving south, and Lee because he inflicted such severe casualties upon the Union army. For this reason, I chose a twotiered victory structure for this game. At a tactical level, casualties, gun & leader losses, and wrecked brigades are used to determine who won “tactically.” At the strategic level, wrecked corps, possession of key road junctions, corps leader casualties, and some measure of the tactical outcome determine won won “strategically.”

5.1 General Victory Determination Notes

5.1a Ignore stragglers when determining wrecked units. A unit is wrecked if all spaces to the left of the wrecked mark are filled with hard casualties.

5.1b A corps is considered wrecked if 25% or more of its brigades are wrecked (again counting units as wrecked according to 5.1a.)

5.1c When determining wrecked units, assume all units have been transferred back to their original commands.

5.1d Possession is defined as the side which last physically occupied the given hex, or, in the case of clearings, the last to occupy the majority of the cleared hexes.

5.1e Victory point costs and bonuses for minor variants are applied equally to both levels of victory. In other words, if a player is given a victory point for using an option, he has a victory point for Tactical purposes and a victory point for Strategic purpose.

5.2 Tactical Victory

Total the victory points accumulated by each side according to the following list:

Each enemy Bde wrecked: 1
Each enemy Div wrecked: 2
Enemy Leader casualties: Rating
Every 100 enemy casualties: 1
Every 5 gun points lost: 1

Find the ratio of the higher to the lower. If this ratio is less than or equal to 1.5, the result is a draw. If the result is greater than 1.5 but less than 3.0, the higher rated side earns a Minor Tactical Victory. If the ratio is 3.0 or more, the higher rated side earns a Major Tactical Victory.

5.3 Strategic Victory Determination

Total the victory points accumulated by each side according to the following list:

Each enemy corps wrecked: 2
Each Corps commander or higher casualty: Rating
Every 5 Tactical Victory points: 1

Terrain	Union	Confederate
Brock Crossing	0	2
Parker’s Store (B2.21)	4	0
Wilderness Tavern (A39.06)	0	3
Tapp Clearing	1	1
Spottswood Clearing	0	3
A12.10	3	1
Chewning Clearing	4	2
Trigg (B37.10)	1	3
Entry hex F

Find the differential between the Union and Confederate victory point totals by subtracting the Confederate total from the Union one. Compare the result to the chart below.

Differential	Result
More than +5	Union Major Strategic Victory
>1 to 5	Union Minor Strategic Victory
-1 to 1	Draw
<-1 to -5	Confederate Minor Strategic Victory
Less than -5	Confederate Major Strategic Victory

6.0 Scenario Set Up Notes

6.0a OCR means “out of command radius.” Units which are OCR are considered to have orders to hold their position on their own. Should a player decide to move such units, he may do so freely, but they must move toward the origin of their parent command radius until they enter into it. As longs as a player desires, however, they may sit in their initial hex.

6.0b Orders may be designated at start for some Union Corps and Division commanders. These orders are considered accepted and implemented at the start of the scenario, unless specified otherwise.

6.0c The Confederate player is usaully not given such historical orders. He may write out his own before play begins and these are considered accepted and implemented when play begins.

6.0d Orders are, however, given for Confederate reinforcements.

6.0e A number followed by a “b” indicates an artillery unit. For example, 3b would be an artillery battery from the 3rd Corps. In the case of Db, the “D” refers to a detached battery.

6.0f A parenthesized number following an artillery unit is that unit’s strength in gun points. For example, 3b(4) would be a battery from 3rd Corps with 4 gun points.

6.0g Where a unit is set up with the designation “all” after its identification, it sets up with all subordinate units and leaders.

6.0h Once placed into the listed hex, Brigades, which may otherwise do so, may be set up with extended lines into adjacent hexes.

7.0 Scenarios

Scenario 1: The Battle of Sander’s Field

Early on the morning of May 5th, Ewell’s corps was discovered deploying across the Orange Turnpike just west of Sander’s Field. When notified of this, Grant had Meade order Warren to attack the Confederates without delay. For a variety of reasons, it took Warren several hours to mount his attack. The Battle of the Wilderness was on. First Turn: 1:00pm May 5th Last Turn: 3:00pm May 5th Scenario Length: 5 turns Maps Used: Map A, only

Union Information: Set Up the following units from Scenario 4:

Grant, AUS HQ, Meade, A Pot HQ, Warren, 5 Corps HQ, 5 Corps Supply, 1/5 (all), Db(2) with or adjacent to any unit of 1/5, 2/5 (all), and 4/5 (all) Orders: As per Scenario 4. Reinforcements: 2:00pm, Entry Hex A: 3/5 (all), Db(2) Orders: Join Corps.

Confederate Information: Set Up the following units from Scenario 4: Ewell, 2 Corps HQ, 2 Corps Supply, J/2 (all), B/R/2, Do/R/2, Da/R/2, Rodes, E/2 (all), 2x 2b(5), 2x 2b(4), 1x 2b(3) Orders: See 6.0c Further orders by initiative, only. Reinforcements: None

Victory Conditions: The Federals get 2 points per wrecked CSA brigade, and 3 points per CSA wrecked division. The Rebels get 1 point per USA wrecked brigade and 2 points per USA wrecked division. Ignore stragglers when determining wrecked status. Each Leader casualty is worth one point. The Union gets 2 points for the control of hex A12.10 and the Confederates get 2 points if they control at least 1/2 of the hexes of Sander’s Field. Most points wins.

Scenario 2: Warren and Sedgwick vs. Ewell

This is a longer version of Scenario 1. It is extended to include the arrival of part of Sedgwick’s 6th Corps on Warren’s right, but still uses only the one map. First Turn: 1:00pm May 5th Last Turn: 9:00pm May 5th Scenario Length: 16 turns Maps Used: Map A, only.

Union Information: Set Up the following units from Scenario 4: Grant, AUS HQ, Meade, A Pot HQ, Warren, 5 Corps HQ, 5 Corps Supply, 1/5 (all), 2/5 (all), 4/5 (all), Db(2) with or adjacent to any unit of 1/5, Sedgwick, 6 Corps HQ, 6 Corps Supply, 1/6 (all, less 4/1/6), 3/2/6, 3/ 6 (all)

Orders: As per Scenario 4 Reinforcements: 2:00pm, Entry Hex A: 3/5 (all), Db(2) Orders: Join Corps.

Confederate Information: Set Up the following units from Scenario 4: Ewell, 2 Corps HQ, 2 Corps Supply, J/2 (all), Rodes, B/R/2, Do/R/2, Da/R/2, E/2 (all), 2x 2b(5), 2x 2b(4), 1x 2b(3), 1 NC Cav. Orders: See 6.0c Further orders by initiative, only. Reinforcements: None

Scenario 3: The Battle of the Plank Road—May 5th, 1864.

After pushing aside a small cavalry screen, AP Hill’s two 3rd Corps Divisions confronted Getty’s three 6th Corps Brigades west of the Brock Road Crossing. This scenario uses only the Map B to depict the ensuing battle, which eventually involved Hancock’s 2nd Corps as well. First Turn: 1:00pm May 5th Last Turn: 9:00pm May 5th Scenario Length: 16 turns Maps Used: Map B, only.

Union Information:

Set Up the following Units from Scenario 4: 3/5 (all), Db(2) with or adjacent to any unit of 3/5, 2/6 (less 3/2/6), Hancock, 2 Corps HQ

Orders: 2 Corps is ordered to hold the Brock Crossing. That order has been accepted. He has an unaccepted order with a status of “D2” to attack down the Plank Road so as to connect with Warren’s flank in the vicinity of B8.20. 3/5 has an unaccepted divisional goal order (status “D2”) to exit the map at B13.35 so as to rejoin the rest of 5 Corps. Its current divisional goal is to defend the vicinity of the Chewning Farm. 3/5 is considered to be attached to 2 Corps. Reinforcements are to rejoin their Corps or Divisions as appropriate. Other than the above, the Union player must use initiative to obtain new orders. For this scenario, 2/6 is considered to be part of 2 Corps. Reinforcements: 1:00pm, Entry Hex F: 3/2 (all), 4/2 (all), 2 Corps Supply, 3x 2b(5), 1x 2b(2) 3:30pm, Entry Hex F: 2/2 (all) 4:30pm, Entry Hex F: 1/2 (less 4/1/2) and 4:30pm, Entry Hex E: 4/1/2

Confederate Information: Set Up the following Units from Scenario 4: Lee, ANVa HQ, ANVa Supply, A.P. Hill, 3 Corps HQ, 3 Corps Supply, H/3 (all), W/3 (all), 1x 3b(5), 4x 3b(4) Orders: See 6.0c Reinforcements: none

Victory Conditions: Each side gets one point for each wrecked enemy brigade and one point for each wrecked enemy division (again, not counting stragglers when determining wrecked status.) Each side gets one point each for occupying: Chewning Farm (B12.28), Brock Crossing (B32.26), Tapp Farm (B21.25), and/or Parker’s Store (B2.21). The Union gets one point for each un-wrecked brigade of 3/5 that successfully exits the map via B13.35.

Scenario 4: The Battles of May 5th

This scenario covers all of the first day of the battle on both maps.

First Turn: 1:00pm May 5th Last Turn: 9:00pm May 5th Scenario Length: 16 turns Maps Used: Both

Union Information: Set Up: Grant, AUS HQ, Meade, A Pot HQ: A32.08; Warren, 5 Corps HQ: A32.06; 5 Corps Supply: A38.06 (Wilderness Tavern); 1/1/5: A19.10; Griffin, 2/1/5: A21.09; 3/1/5: A19.08; Db(2): with or adjacent to any unit of 1/5; Robinson, 1/2/5, 2/2/5: w/i 1 A32.05; 3/2/5 (attached to 1/5): A21.07; 1/3/5: B11.27; 3/3/5: B13.32; Crawford: with any 3/5 brigade; Db(2): with or adjacent to any unit of 3/5; 1/4/5: A19.07; 2/4/5: A18.05; 3/4/5: A17.05; Wadsworth: with any 4/5 brigade; 3x 5b(5) (less 4 gun points): w/i 1 A32.05; 1/1/6: A28.18; 2/1/6: A26.17; 3/1/6: A30.19; 3/2/6 (attached to 1/6): A33.20; Wright: with any 1/6 brigade (incl. 3/2/6); 1/2/6 (2/6 is attached to 2 Corps): B32.25; 2/2/6: B32.23; 4/2/6: B32.27; Getty: with any 2/6 brigade other than 3/ 2/6; Hancock, 2 Corps HQ: with or adjacent to any 2/6 unit; 3/6 (both Bdes, incl. Ricketts): w/i 2 A24.34; 3x 6b(5): w/i 2 A32.06; Sedgwick, 6 Corps HQ: with or adjacent to any 6 Corps unit; 6 Corps Supply: w/i 2 A32.06.

Orders: 5 Corps is to attack Ewell’s forces along the Orange Turnpike. 4/5 has a divisional goal to attack on the left of 1/5. 2 Corps is ordered to hold the Brock Crossing. That order has been accepted. It also has an unaccepted order with a status of “D2” to attack down the Plank Road so as to connect with Warren’s flank in the vicinity of B8.20. 3/6 has a divisional goal. It cannot move until 1:30pm, 5 May. It then must move to rejoin 6 Corps. Except for the batteries serving with 1/5, and 3/5, all 5 and 6 Corps artillery is in the Army of the Potomac Reserve and trace command radius to the A Pot HQ. 6 Corps has orders to attack south-west along the Culpepper Mine Road in support of 5 Corps.

Confederate Information: Set Up: Sta/J/2: A15.14 (OCR); Stwl/J/2: A16.12; Johnson, Ste/J/2: A16.10; J/J/2: A16.08; G/E/2: A8.10; H/E/2: A8.11; P/E/2: A7.11; Early: with any E/2 unit; Ewell, 2 Corps HQ, 2 Corps Supply: anywhere between A9.10 through A15.10 along the Orange Turnpike; B/R/2: A15.08; Rodes, Do/R/2: A15.06; Da/R/2: A15.04; 2x 2b(5), 2x 2b(4), 1x 2b(3): w/i 1 A7.10; 1 NC Cavalry: A24.16; C/H/3: B28.25; K/H/3: B27.25; W/H/3: B25.24; D/H/3: B24.24; Heth: with any H/3 unit; L/W/3: B8.20; T/W/3: B6.20; S/W/3: B4.20; M/W/3: B2.21; Wilcox: with any W/3 unit; 3 Corps Supply, ANVa Supply, 1x 3b(5), 4x 3b(4): w/i 1 B2.21 (Parker’s Store); Lee, ANVa HQ, Hill, 3 Corps HQ: with or adjacent to any 3 Corps unit.

Orders: See 6.0c

Reinforcements: None

Victory Conditions: As per 5.0.

Scenario 5: The Battle of the Wilderness

This scenario covers the entire Battle of the Wilderness—from Warren’s attack on Ewell until the end of May 7th. First Turn: 1:00pm May 5th Last Turn: 7:00pm May 7th Scenario Length: 91 turns Maps Used: Both

Orders: 5 Corps is to attack Ewell’s forces along the Orange Turnpike.

4/5 has a divisional goal to attack on the left of 1/5.

2 Corps is ordered to hold the Brock Crossing. That order has been accepted. It also has an unaccepted order with a status of “D2” to attack down the Plank Road so as to connect with Warren’s flank in the vicinity of B8.20. 3/6 has a divisional goal. It cannot move until 1:30pm, 5 May. It then must move to rejoin 6 Corps. Except for the batteries serving with 1/5, and 3/5, all 5 and 6 Corps artillery is in the Army of the Potomac Reserve and trace command radius to the A Pot HQ. 6 Corps has orders to attack south-west along the Culpepper Mine Road in support of 5 Corps.

Reinforcements: 1:00pm, Entry Hex F: 3/2 (all), 4/2 (all), 2 Corps Supply, 3x 2b(5), 1x 2b(2) Orders: Move to join Corps HQ. 1:00pm, Entry Hex C: 3/9 (all), 1x 9b(5), 1x 9b(3) Orders: Move to vicinity of hex A28.31 and await further orders. 3:30pm, Entry Hex F: 2/2 (all) Orders: Join Corps. 4:00pm, Entry Hex C: 2/9 (all), Burnside, 9 Corps HQ, 9 Corps Supply Orders: Move to vicinity of hex A28.31 and await further orders. 4:30pm, Entry Hex F: 1/2 (less 4/1/2): Orders: Move to join Corps. 4:30pm, Entry Hex E: 4/1/2 Orders: Move to join Division. 2:00am, 6 May, Entry Hex C: 1/9 (all), Prov/ 9, 1x 9b(5): Orders: Move to join Corps. 5:00am, 6 May, Entry Hex D: Kitching Orders: Report to A Pot HQ for assignment. 5:30am, 6 May, Entry Hex C: 4/1/6 Orders: Move to join Division. 5:30am, 6 May, Entry Hex C or D: Engineers Orders: Report to A Pot HQ for assignment.

Reinforcements: 3:00am, 6 May, Entry Hex B: J/R/2 5:00am, 6 May, Entry Hex B: R/R/2 5:00am, 6 May, Entry Area G: Longstreet, 1 Corps (all, less Pickett’s Div—unless 4.5a is being used. 5:30am, 6 May, Entry Area G: A/3 (all)

Victory Conditions: As per 5.0.

Scenario 6: The Second Day

It was Grant’s intention to attack Lee all along the line at first light on May 6th. While the attack of Warren and Sedgwick held little promise of success, Hancock had six divisions—nearly half the Army of the Potomac—to throw against A.P. Hill’s two divisions. Moreover, 9th Corps was directed to march into the fight and attack through the gap that existed between the Orange Turnpike and Plank Road fronts. Lee was counting on the arrival of Longstreet’s two divisions and Anderson’s Division of Hill’s Corps to bolster his line. This scenario allows players to recreate the second day of the Battle of the Wilderness. Be forewarned, however, that the loss numbers for many units are very rough—virtually no data exists which distinguishes between casualties for May 5th and May 6th. For the Confederates, little data exists at all.

First Turn: 5:00am May 6th Last Turn: 8:00pm May 6th (By mutual agreement, players are free to continue into May 7th) Scenario Length: 31 turns Maps Used: Both Note: The number in brackets following each brigade is the number of casualties the brigade sustained, if any, before the game begins. These are not stragglers. If no number is given, the unit is at full strength.

Union Information: Set Up: Hancock, 2 Corps HQ, 2 Corps Supply: w/ i 2 B32.26; 1/1/2: B39.14; 2/1/2 [2]: B35.17; 3/1/2 [3]: B38.14; Barlow, 4/1/2: B36.15; 1/2/2 [1]: B33.21; 2/2/2 [1]: B31.25; Gibbon, 3/2/2 [1]: B32.23; 1x 2b(2): w/i 2 B32.26; Birney, 1/3/2 [2]: B29.25; 2/3/2 [4]: B29.24; Mott, 1/4/2 [1]: B29.23; 2/4/2 [1]: B30.23; 3x 2b(5): w/i 3 B36.15; 1/1/5 [6]: A23.10; Griffin, 2/1/5 [2]: A23.08; 3/1/5 [3]: A23.07; 1/2/5, Robinson: A26.06; 2/2/5 (attached to 4/5, which is in turn attached to 2 Corps): B24.28; 3/2/5: A26.04; 1/3/5: A24.04; Crawford, 3/3/5: A24.05; 1/4/5 [2] (4/5 (all + 2/2/5) is attached to 2 Corps): B25.29; 2/4/5 [2]: B23.28; 3/4/5 [2]: B25.30; Wadsworth: with any 4/5 unit; Wright, 1/1/6 [2]: A22.13; 2/1/6 [1]: A22.11; 3/1/6 [2]: A21.15; Getty, 1/2/6 [4] (2/6 (less 3/2/6) is attached to 2 Corps): B30.25; 2/2/6 [8]: B30.24; 3/2/6 [4] (3/2/6 is attached to 1/6): A21.17 (OCR); 4/2/6 [3]: B30.26; Ricketts, 1/3/6: A24.14; 2/3/6 [3]: A20.18 (OCR); Sedgwick, 6 Corps HQ: A23.16; 6 Corps Supply: A24.16; 3x 6b(5): w/i 1 A25.17; Warren, 5 Corps HQ: A27.08; 5 Corps Supply: A29.08; 3x 5b(5): w/i 1 A32.05; Grant, AUS HQ, Meade, A Pot HQ: A32.08;

The following are in road column on the Germanna Plank Road turning onto the Orange Turnpike with the head and tail of each division’s column listed. Units and leaders may be set up anywhere along the road segment specified. 1/9 (all): A34.12 through A33.15 (inclusive); 2/9 (all): A31.08 through A35.07 (inclusive); 3/9 (all + Prov/9): A36.07 through A34.11 (inclusive); Burnside, 9 Corps HQ, 9 Corps Supply, 1x 9b(5), 1x 9b(3): Anywhere along the 9 Corps Road Column. Orders: 4/5 (with 2/2/5 attached) is attached to 2 Corps. It has a divisional goal to attack the left of the Confederate forces arrayed on the Plank Road. It is to rejoin 2 Corps command radii after this is accomplished. 2 Corps: Attack down Plank road toward hex B14.20, then attack towards the Chewning Farm. 5 Corps: Its orders are to attack to capture Sander’s Field and their status is “D1.” 6 Corps: Its orders are to attack along the Culpepper Mine Road and their status is “D1.” 9 Corps: It is to remain in place and await orders. Prov/9 is attached to 3/9. Reinforcements: 5:00am, 6 May, Entry Hex D: Kitching Orders: Has been assigned to 4/5 and must join that division. 5:30am, 6 May, Entry Hex C: 4/1/6 Orders: Move to join Division. 5:30am, 6 May, Entry Hex C or D: Engineers Orders: Move to A Pot HQ for assignment.

Confederate Information: Set Up: H/E/2 [2]: A18.15; Early, P/E/2: A18.16; G/E/2 [1]: A17.18; Da/R/2 [2]: A21.04; J/R/2 (attached to E/2): A16.19 (OCR); Rodes, Do/R/2 [1]: A21.06; B/R/2 [1]: A20.07; Johnson, Stwl/J/2 [3]: A19.13; J/J/2 [1]: A19.09 (OCR); Ste/J/2 [4]: A19.11; Sta/J/2 [3]: A18.14; D/H/3 [3]: B26.26; C/H/3 [4]: B22.23; K/H/3 [3]: B24.25; Heth, W/H/3 [3]: B25.25; T/W/3 [1]: B27.24; L/W/3 [2]: B26.23; Wilcox, S/W/3 [2]: B27.25; M/W/3 [1]: B27.26; 1x 3b(5): w/i 1 B23.24; ANVa Supply, 3 Corps Supply, 1x 3b(4): w/ i 1 B2.21; 3x 3b(4): w/i 3 B12.28 Div Goal: Defend Chewning Farm; 2x 2b(5), 2x 2b(4), 1x 2b(3): w/i 2 A12.10; Ewell, 2 Corps HQ: A17.09; 2 Corps Supply: A13.10; Lee, ANVa HQ, A.P. Hill, 3 Corps HQ: B18.21. Orders: See 6.0c E/2 has a divisional goal to defend the left of the 2 Corps line. For the reinforcements: R/R/2 is to report to Rodes’s Division. The following orders are in effect unless changed using the rules in 4.3 and 4.5. 1 Corps is ordered to report to the ANVa HQ. A/3 is ordered to rejoin 3 Corps. Reinforcements: 5:00am, 6 May, Entry Hex B: R/R/2 5:00am, 6 May, Entry Area G: Longstreet, 1 Corps (all, less Pickett’s Div—unless 4.5a is being used. 5:30am, 6 May, Entry Area G: A/3 (all)

Victory Conditions: As per 5.0.

Scenario 7: The Wasted Day

Like many Civil War battles, the severe fighting in the Wilderness was followed by a day of rest. This scenario explores the possibilities of fighting on a third day. Because of the paucity of Confederate reports from this late period of the war, Rebel strengths border on guesswork. Note: The number in brackets following each brigade is the number of casualties the brigade sustained, if any, before the game begins. These are not stragglers. If no number is given, the unit is at full strength. First Turn: 5:00am May 7th Last Turn: 7:00pm May 7th Scenario Length: 29 turns Maps Used: Both

Union Information: Set Up: 1/1/2: B40.11; 2/1/2 [3]: B37.16; Barlow, 3/1/2 [5]: B38.14; 4/1/2 [9]: B39.13; Gibbon, 1/2/2 [5]: B34.18; 2/2/2 [2]: B35.17; 3/2/2 [6]: B33.20; 1/3/2 [9]: B33.25; Birney, 2/3/2 [14]: B32.25; Mott, 1/4/2 [4]: B32.22; 2/4/2 [3]: B33.23; Hancock, 2 Corps HQ, 2 Corps Supply: B32.26; 3x 2b(5), 1x 2b(2): w/i 3 B32.26; 1/1/5 [9]: A30.06; Griffin, 2/1/5 [3]: A27.08; 3/1/5 [5]: A26.09; 1/2/5 [1]: A26.05; 2/2/5 [5]: A27.02; Robinson, 3/2/5 [2]: A26.03; 1/3/5 [5]: A33.09; 3/3/5 [1]: A32.08; Crawford: with any 3/5 unit; Replacement Leader (4/5, Wadsworth has been killed), 1/4/5 [7], 2/4/5 [7], 3/4/5 [6]: w/i 1 A36.05; Warren, 5 Corps HQ, 5 Corps Supply, 3x 5b(5): w/i 3 A29.08; Wright, 1/1/6 [4]: A30.09; 2/1/6 [1]: A28.09; 3/1/6 [3]: A31.11; 4/1/6 [3]: A30.08; 1/2/6 [6]: A36.13; 2/2/6 [13]: A40.15; 3/2/6 [6]: A34.12; Getty, 4/2/6 [5]: A38.14; Ricketts, 1/3/6 [1]: A33.11; 2/3/6 [9]: A32.11; Sedgwick, 6 Corps Supply, 3x 6b(5): w/i 3 A35.11; 6 Corps HQ: A35.11; Engineers (attached to 1/5): A26.06; Kitching [1] (attached to 4/5): w/i 1 A36.05; 1/1/9 [5]: B25.29; Stevenson, 2/1/9 [1]: B26.28; Prov/9 (attached to 1/9): B28.28; 1/2/9 [4]: B23.32; 2/2/9 [2]: B24.30; Potter: with any 2/9 unit; 1/3/9 [4]: B21.35; Willcox, 2/3/9 [1]: B22.33; Burnside, 9 Corps HQ: B26.32; 9 Corps Supply: A35.01; 1x 9b(5), 1x 9b(3): A34.01; Grant, AUS HQ, Meade, A Pot HQ: A32.07. Orders: All corps have orders to defend in place. Reinforcements: None.

Confederate Information: Set Up: K/K/1 [5]: B29.10; Kershaw, H/K/1 [5]: B28.12; W/K/1 [3]: B27.15 (OCR); B/K/1 [5]: B32.07 (OCR); J/F/1 [2]: B24.23 (OCR); L/F/1 [6]: B21.26 (OCR); A/F/1 [3]: B24.17 (OCR); B/F/1 [2]: B17.24; Field, G/F/1 [2]: B19.23; 1 Corps HQ, 1 Corps Supply, 3x 1b(5): w/i 4 B18.21; H/E/2 [4]: A23.16; Early, P/E/2 [4]: A25.17; G/E/2 [2]: A27.18; R/R/2: A19.03 (OCR); Rodes, Do/R/2 [1]: A18.06; B/R/2 [1]: A18.08; Da/R/2 [2]: A19.05; J/R/2 (attached to E/2): A29.19; Stwl/J/2 [5]: A21.13; J/J/2 [2]: A19.10; Johnson, Ste/J/2 [6]: A20.11; Sta/J/2 [5]: A22.14; Ewell, 2 Corps HQ: A20.12; 2 Corps Supply: A12.10; 2x 2b(5), 2x 2b(4), 1x 2b(3): with or adjacent to any 2 Corps unit; Prn/A/3 [4] (A/3 is attached to 1 Corps): A20.25; M/A/3 [1]: B23.25; H/A/3: B15.25 (OCR); Anderson, W/A/3: B21.24; Pry/A/3 [5]: B24.21 (OCR); W/H/3 [4]: B15.28; D/H/3 [6]: B17.27; Heth, C/H/3 [6]: B16.27; K/H/3 [4]: B14.28; L/W/3 [3]: B12.35; Wilcox, S/W/3 [3]: B12.31; M/W/3 [3]: B11.34; T/W/3 [2]: B13.30; A.P. Hill, 3 Corps HQ, 3 Corps Supply, 1x 3b(5), 4x 3b(4): w/i 4 B12.28; Lee (Lee is being used as the acting 1 Corps commander, Longstreet has been wounded), ANVa HQ, ANVa Supply: w/i 6 B4.20. Orders: See 6.0c K/1 has a divisional goal to defend the right of 1 Corps from its current position. Reinforcements: None

Victory Conditions: Use 5.0 through 5.3. Note that existing conditions will count toward victory. In effect, players will be attempting to either exploit or salvage the historical situation.

Player’s Notes

Union: The Union player has an immense advantage in numbers, but he will spend the entire game struggling to bring it effectively to bear. Despite the numeric disparity, however, you cannot be too cavalier about losses or you may find yourself with no un-wrecked brigades with which to continue the attack. Even though you are at a disadvantage maneuvering in the Wilderness, do not be lulled into a simple slugfest along the Orange Turnpike or the Plank Road. Think about sending a division down the Flat Run Road to sweep south on Ewell’s flank or a division to reinforce Crawford at Chewning’s Farm. Do not waste your strength in piecemeal attacks, but take your time to get everyone rolling at once. Make the Rebel dance to your tune and you will be able to bring your numerical superiority into play.

Confederate: The Army of Northern Virginia simply cannot afford to stand toe to toe with the Army of the Potomac and expect to survive. Once 2nd and 9th Corps get into the action, you will be outnumbered by nearly 2 to 1, so you must strike early and hard. Use your maneuverability to mass troops for local superiority. For example, consider withdrawing Heth from the Brock Road/ Plank Road crossing to concentrate Hill and Ewell against Warren and Sedgwick. If this is done well, you could put 5 Corps out of the battle very quickly. Or, consider bringing Anderson’s division in along the Flat Run Road to take the Union position in the flank. Like Robert E. Lee, you must take chances in order to win. There is one topographical issue that both sides can try to employ which escaped both Grant and Lee: Chewning’s Farm. Because of the thickness of the Wilderness terrain, there is a tendency to fight the battle along the roadways. Historically, both sides fell prey to this as well. As a result, for much of the battle there was a yawning gap between Ewell and Hill on one side and Warren and Hancock on the other. If either general had been able to assemble sufficient strength to seize the high ground around Chewning’s and then effectively use it, the outcome could have been much different. Federal possession of Chewning’s threatens any advance along the Plank Road, and therefore force the Rebels to attack a strong position. Confederate possession of Chewning’s threatens the left flank of Warren’s Corps.

Designer’s Notes

This is a tough battle to do a game on, because the numeric disparity is so huge. My underlying assumption, based on extensive reading of the literature on the Wilderness, is that the terrain and the Army of the Potomac’s inability to sustain an attack prevented Grant from making decisive use of his numerical advantage. This shows up in the Wilderness effects and the use of Divisional Attack Stoppage. With the absence of these rules, Ewell and Hill are hard pressed to avoid annihilation before the end of May 5th. Let me touch on a few things which were not included: • Forest Fires: Yes, there are a number of dramatic stories of wounded men dying in the fires started by the combat, and it is also true that a section of Hancock’s breastworks caught fire on May 6th and that this contributed greatly to the brief Confederate breakthrough. True as this may be, the fires were not, however, a tactical issue and would have been a real pain to include in the game from the playability standpoint. • Cavalry: A conscious decision was made not to include the cavalry actions. For one thing, it would have required a third map. For another, it would have made the game even more imbalanced. The Union cavalry was mostly detailed to guard the trains and watch the extreme left flank; if they had been thrown into the battle, equipped as they were with rapid fire weapons and trained to fight in a more open manner, the battle could have easily been a major Union victory. • The Supply Train: An early version of the game had rules for protecting the Federal trains which were crossing the river and moving off map. But it quickly became apparent that the Rebels were not going to be able to interfere with this movement and the rules were dropped. • The Union Artillery Reserve: The Artillery Reserve (which did such great service at Gettysburg) spent the bulk of the battle parked at Chancellorsville. There simply wasn’t any effective use for these guns in the tight Wilderness terrain. • Breastworks: Aside from the series optional rule and the “quickie” version presented here, no additional breastworks effects or rules have been added here. Both sides did construct breastworks and these were much more substantial than those used at Gettysburg the year before, but they were still much less substantial than those to be used just a few days later at Spottsylvania. Essentially, this was a transition battle be- tween those with no field fortifications and those with extensive works. Given all of this, we decided to err on the side of simplicity and not include them in a manner which would have made the optional rule required and the expenditure of a large number of counters for breastworks. The morale and wreck levels deserve some comment, especially for the Army of the Potomac. Because of the heavy casualties at Gettysburg, the resulting merger of regiments and brigades, and the heavy influx of bounty recruits, many of the Union brigades were simply not as good as they had been the previous summer. For example, all of what had been 3 Corps was compressed into three 2 Corps brigades under Birney and Mott. What was left of 1 Corps now comprised 2/5 and 4/5. Ayer’s Brigade of 1/5 essentially the remains of the division he had lead at Gettysburg. There were also some utterly green brigades— such as the Maryland brigade in 2/5. Taking all this into account, the fighting quality of the army had suffered badly. It was a conscious decision to have no “A” morale Union brigades and to compute some brigades as if they were a level lower for purposes of wreck levels. The lack of morale and esprit would inevitably lead to less staying power in an extended fight. On the Confederate side, the issues are more complex. There had been heavy casualties at Gettysburg, of course, and the loss of brigadiers was especially serious. However, many of the new brigadiers turned out to be superior leaders and the Rebel troops were somehow able to maintain a better morale level in the face of adversity than did their blue-coated adversaries. Part of this is due to Lee’s leadership, part is due to the natural moral advantage of being on the defensive. In any event, the Rebel morale values are generally much higher than Union ones, and the wreck levels of some units were computed as though the units had a higher morale. The variants involving Longstreet and Pickett are highly recommended. A key feature of the Union failure on May 6th was that Hancock kept an entire division out of the fight watching his left flank for a Rebel attack. For those historians of the Army of Northern Virginia who are wondering where Archer’s brigade is: because of the heavy casualties absorbed in Pennsylvania, this small brigade was merged with what had been Brockenbrough’s brigade and was collectively under the command of BG Harry “Mud” Walker. Students of the battle may well observe that Ewell and Warren were actually in contact as early as 10:00am on May 5th and that Grant issued orders at about that time for Warren to pitch into the Rebels in his front. Early versions of this game used this as the starting point but the situation was just too one-sided. In a game situation, the Yankee player isn’t going to suffer the delays or make the mistakes that befell Grant and Meade.

Historical Notes

The Battle of the Wilderness was the first action of a 40-day campaign of blood, suffering, and mud, unmatched by anything that had happened in the previous three years of war. Unlike previous campaigns, the Federal Army of the Potomac did not withdraw to lick its wounds after each contest, but instead continued indomitably onward—which reflected the character of the new Union General-in-Chief, Ulysses S. Grant. Grant’s plan of campaign was very simple: the Army of the Potomac, supported by the independent 9th Corps, would advance toward Richmond. The Army of the Potomac was under the nominal command of George G. Meade, but he was placed into an unusual position by the presence of Grant. The Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, under the already legendary R.E. Lee, would be forced to contest this advance. Regardless of the outcome of each individual battle, Meade’s army would continue the advance. In this way, Lee (and the Confederacy) would eventually be worn down to defeat. Lee, of course, was aware of the odds and determined to strike a blow at the new Union hero in order to take the initiative away from the Federal hosts and therefore keep the struggle going. Because Grant intended to fight an extended campaign, the Army of the Potomac was moving with a supply train that was much larger than usual—a moving supply base in fact—and its protection was a major focus of the orders for the initial phase of the campaign. The three infantry corps of the Army of the Potomac would cross the Rapidan River at the Germanna Ford and Ely’s Ford, march into the Wilderness, wheel to the west, and take up a line behind which the trains could safely move through Fredericksburg to Belle Plain which would serve as the supply depot for most of May. Sheridan’s cavalry would screen the infantry with one division, send another to scatter the Rebel cavalry that had spent the winter near Fredericksburg, and use the last division to protect the train itself. Burnside’s 9th Corps, which had the longest march to make, would necessarily bring up the rear. While Meade’s infantry could easily have passed through the Wilderness into the more open country around Spottsylvania on the first day of the march, it was felt that this would unduly expose the trains and leave 9th Corps isolated without support. Thus, the evening of May 4th found the bulk of the Federal infantry still within the Wilderness or on the northern and eastern fringes of it: Warren’s 5th Corps was at Wilderness Tavern, 6th Corps was just north of the Germanna Ford, 2nd Corps was at Chancellorsville, and most of Burnside’s corps was still near Rappahannock Station— some ten miles north of Germanna Ford. Meanwhile, Lee and his army had not been inactive. Signs of preparation for a move had been noticed for several days in the Federal camps, which were easily observed from a Confederate post on top of Clark Mountain. Preliminary plans had been made. Once confirmation of Grant’s movement was obtained, the ragged veterans of Lee’s army began marching to meet the new Northern champion. Ewell’s Second Corps was to march due east on the Orange Turnpike, while two divisions (Heth and Wilcox) of Hill’s Third Corps used the roughly parallel Orange Plank Road located about a mile to the south. Hill’s last division (Anderson) was detailed to watch the Rapidan Fords, west of the known Union line of advance, to prevent Federal troops from crossing in Lee’s rear. The rest of Lee’s infantry, the two First Corps divisions under Longstreet, were marching from their camps south of Gordonsville and would not be available until May 6th. The battle itself was brought about because of the failure of the Yankee cavalry to patrol the roads leading towards the army. This task had been assigned to the 3rd Cavalry Division under the command of James Wilson. Wilson, who had been on Grant’s staff at Vicksburg, was holding his first field command of the war. On the evening of May 4th, Wilson’s division was concentrated near Parker’s Store (on the Plank Road) with not even a detachment left to patrol the Turnpike, thus allowing Ewell to approach, undetected, to within 2 miles of Warren’s campfires. To compound this error, on the morning of the 5th, Wilson took almost all of his division south from the Plank Road to attempt to engage the Rebel cavalry. Only 500 troopers of the 5th New York were left to patrol the Plank Road, along which A.P. Hill was driving eastward. As a result of Wilson’s failure, Grant and Meade went to sleep on the night of the 4th utterly unaware of how close the Rebel infantry was. When Ewell’s divisions were discovered deploying across the Turn- pike the next morning, it was thought to be merely a small force of observation and both Grant and Meade wanted Warren to attack immediately in order to destroy it. Moreover, they were totally ignorant of Hill’s column closing in on the important Brock Road/Plank Road crossing. Warren responded slowly to the order to attack, partly because that was his manner and partly because two of his divisional commanders were strongly advising against attack. The 3rd Division (under Crawford) had advanced nearly to the Plank Road and was in position to observe the skirmishing between Hill’s advance and the lone cavalry regiment left by Wilson. Crawford was adamant that his troops should remain where they were, on the high ground of Chewning’s Farm, and should in fact be reinforced. At the same time, Griffin, whose 1st Division was best posted to make the attack upon Ewell, was receiving reports from his brigade commanders that the Rebels were in greater strength than was supposed. Meanwhile, Wadsworth’s 4th Division was struggling to form on Griffin’s left and thereby added to the delay. As the hours ticked by, Grant became impatient with the delay and began to prod Meade, who in turn prodded Warren. Warren for his part, suggested that the attack not be made. At this point, according to some sources, Grant or one of his staff suggested that the Army of the Potomac seemed reluctant to fight—this accusation led Meade to issue peremptory orders to Warren to attack immediately. So, at 1:00pm, on May 5th, the Battle of the Wilderness was on. The first attack was a quick, disjointed affair. Griffin’s division, supported on the left by Wadsworth, hit Johnson’s Confederate division at the west end of a 40 acre clearing known as Sander’s Field. One Rebel brigade was shattered and its commander killed, but the Union advance had misaligned the Federal brigades and made them vulnerable to flank attack. This attack was made handsomely by Steuart’s Brigade. Several of Griffin’s brigades were badly cut up and the entire division fled back to the east of the field. Meanwhile, Wadsworth was attacking Rodes’s division, posted to the right (south) of Johnson. Again, the Yankees were initially successful, found a gap in the Rebel deployment and struck it hard. But Ewell brought up his reserve division under Early to counterattack, and the Northerners were again flanked and driven back into confusion. In this fight, the remains of the once mighty Iron Brigade (1/4/5) were routed for the first time in that brigade’s history. With two of his four divisions badly mauled, Warren ceased offensive operations, and took up a line of defense across the Orange Turnpike. For most of the rest of the battle, 5th Corps would not be considered an asset capable of offense. One of Sedgwick’s 6th Corps divisions, under Wright, attempted to drive down the Culpepper Mine Road, but was stoutly opposed by a regiment of cavalry and skirmishers from the Stonewall Brigade. It was not until almost 4:00pm that Wright was able to attack the real Confederate infantry line and was easily stopped by Early’s division which had been shifted to the Rebel left in response to 6th Corps’s threat. About an hour later, Rickett’s division of 6th Corps arrived and attacked. It met with no more success than did Wright’s division. Although badly outnumbered, Ewell had been able to hold off the combined forces of Warren and Sedgwick because the Union attacked in a disjointed manner with no more than five brigades involved at any one time. The focus of activity shifted south and east, where A.P. Hill confronted Hancock’s 2nd Corps on the Plank Road. When Grant and Meade finally became aware of Hill’s advance, they had no infantry readily available to meet the threat except for Getty’s 6th Corps division which had arrived at Wilderness Tavern early in the morning. Three of Getty’s brigades were quickly sent south down the Germanna Plank Road to hold the vital crossing of the Brock Road with the Orange Plank Road. Getty’s fourth brigade was already moving to join Wright’s attack and was attached to Wright’s division for most of the battle. At the same time, orders were sent to Hancock suspending his march to Shady Grove Church and to order him to concentrate at the Brock Road intersection to attack Hill. The Federals had the initial upper hand when Getty arrived at the Brock Crossing just as the 5th New York Cavalry was disintegrating. In fact, Getty and his staff formed a skirmish line across the road and rebuffed Heth’s skirmishers long enough for the leading Federal brigade to rush up and form into line. Although the vital road crossing was now secured for the Federals, it would not be until mid-afternoon that Hancock’s troops would arrive in sufficient strength to assail Heth’s line. (The other of Hill’s two divisions on the field was deployed along the wide gap between Heth’s left and Ewell’s right.) The first troops to arrive were Birney’s and Mott’s divisions—the remnants of the old 3rd Corps which had been smashed at Gettysburg. About 4:00 pm, just as Wright’s attack was making headway against Ewell’s left, the three divisions went forward. The attack, which should have been a success, was hindered by the Wilderness terrain and poor tactical execution. Mott’s two brigades performed badly and were forced back in disorder. As the attack stalled, Gibbon’s division arrived on the Federal left and was committed to the fray. The weight of numbers and the length of the Federal battle line were beginning to tell on Heth’s troops, so Lee ordered Wilcox to abandon his movement to connect with Ewell and to march to the fighting. At approximately the same time, Grant ordered Wadsworth’s division of the 5th Corps to march south from Wilderness Tavern, through the thickets, and form on Hancock’s right to flank the Confederate line. Hancock had his last division, Barlow’s, form for a similar attack on Hill’s right flank. Both of these flanking movements were stopped by nightfall, the thin Rebel line, and the impossible terrain. Wadsworth may have been halted by as few as 125 men from an Alabama regiment. While Hancock had not been able to make the decisive breakthrough that he wanted to achieve, by the time nightfall brought an end to the day’s fighting he had placed Hill into a very poor position. The two battered Rebel divisions were badly intermingled, flanked on both sides, and in a position too far in advance of the nearest support (Ewell’s corps). Incredibly, Hill refused to pull back out of the trap and even refused permission for his men to entrench. Supposedly, Hill was concerned that his men be allowed to rest during the night, and he was confident that Longstreet and Anderson would soon be in position to relieve him. Grant’s plans for the next morning were simple: he wanted Hancock to continue his assault on Hill, and he wanted Sedgwick and Warren to renew the attack on Ewell. Finally, he wanted Burnside’s corps to march into the gap between Ewell and Hill so as to cut Lee’s army in two. The attack was originally planned for 4:30 am, but was postponed at Meade’s request. Lee’s plans for the 6th are less clear, but it appears that he had abandoned his original intention of using Longstreet to flank Grant on the left. It appears he now intended to use the two 1st Corps divisions to relieve Hill. If so, it indicates how rapidly Grant was able to impose his will on the Confederate commander—something none of his predecessors had been able to accomplish. While the southern leader may have been at bay, he was by no means content to remain passively in place to receive Grant’s blows. Accordingly, Ewell was ordered to make an attack at first light on Sedgwick and Warren. Hill was to hold his position in anticipation of Longstreet’s arrival. Ewell got in the first blow, striking Warren and Sedgwick before they could mount their own attack. While the Confederate attack was a minor affair and made no headway, it did serve to prevent Meade’s right wing from taking the offensive. By mid-morning, the situation along the turnpike was a stand-off and would remain so until late in the evening. Hancock’s attack on Hill was, at least initially, more successful. With three divisions in front and one on the left flank, the Rebels had no chance and most of them knew it. The Federal assault carried forward from near the Brock Road almost to the Tapp Farm. However, the apparent success was somewhat illusionary: Hill was taking few casualties, since his men were simply falling back to get out of a bad position; moreover, as Wadsworth’s flanking column pressed southward, it collided with the right flank of the 2 Corps line causing great confusion. As a result, the attack bogged down and paused just as the troops reached the Tapp Farm clearing. Now began a series of events which became known in Confederate literature as “the miracle of the Wilderness.” If Hancock—the most energetic Federal corps commander—had been able to reform his troops and continue the attack, Lee’s army would have been in serious trouble. But Hancock was not granted the time, because Longstreet finally arrived on the scene and made a sharp counterattack which forced the Federals back and stabilized the Confederate line. Anderson’s 3rd Corps division also arrived to further bolster Lee. A slight lull ensued, during which both sides tried to reform so as to continue the fight. Longstreet was ready first. Alerted by his staff to the existence of a cleared track (the unfinished railroad) through the forest which led beyond the federal flank, he sent four brigades to attack Hancock’s flank along this route. They struck the Union line hard. Stunned by hordes of Rebels bursting out of the woods in their front and rear, the Yankees broke and fell back all the way to their starting point along the Brock Road. Wadsworth was killed, and Mott’s division terribly mauled. Only the accidental wounding of Longstreet by his own men and the ensuing command chaos prevented the Rebels from following up on this success. And what of Burnside? Although he had been ordered to be in position to attack towards Parker’s Store at 4:30 am, when the fighting began his column was still near Wilderness Tavern. Had Burnside been in place when Hancock attacked, at least some of Longstreet’s and Anderson’s men would have had to oppose his threat. As it happened, Lee was able to place Heth and Wilcox across the gap between Ewell and the Plank Road fighting before Burnside had even arrived. Even though these two Rebel divisions had seen heavy fighting, the three fresh 9th Corps divisions were unable to make headway against them. Accordingly, Grant soon began to detach troops from Burnside to reinforce Hancock. At 4:15 pm Lee, who had more or less became Longstreet’s replacement, sent another attack forward against Hancock’s line which was now behind stout breastworks. Although some of Mott’s men at the point of the attack broke and ran (partly because their breastworks caught fire), the Federal line was simply too strong to be successfully attacked by the weakened Rebel brigades. The attack stopped and the Rebels fell back. This ended the fighting along the Plank Road. The Rebels were not strong enough to attack Hancock’s new line directly. The Federals were low on ammunition and were badly battered. Neither side was able to press the issue. The final action of the day occurred shortly after 6 pm, when John Gordon led a two brigade attack on Sedgwick’s exposed right flank. The attack mauled two Union brigades and caused a momentary panic. Gordon felt this attack could have led to the complete defeat of Grant’s army if he had been allowed to attack earlier and in greater force. While many historians have echoed this view, it is also the case that much of Gordon’s success was attributable to the darkness that was falling at the time of the attack. On May 7th neither army felt strong enough to attack. Grant drew in his lines and began to send the great trains off towards Belle Plain. That night the Army of the Potomac marched away from the Army of Northern Virginia. Old soldiers watched the direction of the march. In all previous attempts, the efforts of the troops in such a battle would be squandered as their general lost heart and withdrew to recuperate for another try. This time, however, the army turned down roads which would take it further south, towards Spottsylvania. If the Battle of the Wilderness was not a victory for this man Grant, he would nonetheless refuse to treat it as a defeat; as a result, it was his first step towards final victory.

Personality Sheets

Personality Sheet—US Grant

Ulysses S. Grant, Lieutenant General, General-in-Chief, Armies of the United States

Rating: 4 Starting Army Status: 4 Anti-Initiative: None

Background: Grant started the war as a mustering officer for the state of Illinois. He briefly commanded a regiment, then was promoted to Brigadier General and given command of the important post of Cairo, Illinois at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. From here his career took off. He earned his second star for the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, survived the savage Rebel counterstroke at Shiloh, and became a true northern hero in 1863 with the capture of Vicksburg and the defeat of Bragg’s army at Chattanooga. This led to his promotion to the reinstated rank of Lieutenant General and command over all of the Union armies.

Panic Rolls:

Wrecked Divisions	0-3	4-6	7-9	10-12	13 or more
Status of 2	—	12	11	10	9
Status of 1	12	11	10	9	8

On Panic: If Grant panics, then orders are to be immediately issued to all Union troops to withdraw off the east map edge (either map) along the trails, roads, or pikes. These orders are automatically accepted on arrival. If the Brock Road off the south map edge is open, troops may use it to withdraw. The Union player gets 1 strategic victory point for each unwrecked division which exits via the Brock Road route.

Panic Demands: Grant may make two panic demands on Lee each day.

Personality Sheet—Geo. Meade

George G. Meade, Major General, Commander, Army of the Potomac

Rating: 3 Starting Army Status: 3 Anti-Initiative: None

Background: Meade had served as a brigade, division, and corps commander in the Army of the Potomac before being given command of that army. At all levels, he showed a high degree of competence, if not brilliance. His reaction to being given army command was “what did I do to deserve this” which reflects not a humble meekness, but actually a dread of the position. His conduct of affairs at Gettysburg, a few short weeks after having the command drop in his lap, showed him to be an outstanding defensive commander. His critics would find him wanting in aggressive qualities. He would become very frustrated working under the awkward command arrangement imposed by Grant, but would still be the army’s commander when Lee surrendered at Appomattox.

Panic Rolls:

Wrecked Divisions	0-3	4-6	7-9	10-12	13 or more
Status of 2	—	12	11	10	9
Status of 1	12	11	10	9	8

On Panic: If Meade panics, then orders from Grant to Meade must go through the same Acceptance procedure as all others, even if the two are stacked together.

Panic Demands: Meade may not make panic demands.

Personality Sheet—Ambrose Burnside

Ambrose E. Burnside, Major General, Commander, 9th Army Corps

Rating: 0 Starting Corps Status: 3 Anti-Initiative: None

Background: Burnside was a mediocre commander at best and clearly out of his depth in higher command. To Burn’s credit, he was strong enough to freely recognize and admit this fact himself—a vast difference to the bloated self-opinions of so many other Civil War commanders, notably Joe Hooker. His exploits along the North Carolina coast in 1862 earned him both of his stars, but when forced to play against the enemy’s “first string” he was often found wanting. His capture and defense of Knoxville does deserve more attention than it gets, but his inevitable slowness was a major factor in Grant’s inability to defeat Lee in the Wilderness. Burnside’s last effort for the Union cause was the botched assault at the Battle of the Crater, July 30th, 1864 near Petersburg.

Panic Rolls:

Wrecked 9th Corps Divisions	0-2	3-4	5-6	7 or more
Status of 2	—	12	10	8
Status of 1	12	10	8	6

On Panic: If Burnside panics, all orders to the 9th Corps receive an additional column shift left on the Acceptance Table, and 9th Corps may not be given attack orders.

Panic Demands: Burnside may not make panic demands.

Personality Sheet—RE Lee

Robert E. Lee, General, Commander, Army of Northern Virginia

Rating: 4 Starting Army Status: 4 Anti-Initiative: None

Background: Robert E. Lee is a legend in American military history because of his many brilliant victories against long odds. By the spring of 1864, however, both he and his army were beginning to wear out. The Confederacy’s best hope for survival lay in the chance that he could once again inflict the kind of blow that blow which would force the Union army to withdraw and regroup. While his defense against Grant’s overland campaign is regarded as one of his finest hours, he was never able to wrest the initiative away from the enemy. As a result he was forced into the siege at Richmond and Petersburg which led to eventual defeat. Like Grant, Lee would not “panic” in the usual sense of the word. However, he knew that he had to preserve his army if the south would have any hope for survival. Consequently, panic here means that Lee has decided he must withdraw from the fight in order to save his army.

Panic Rolls:

Wrecked Divisions	0-3	4-6	7 or more
Status of 2	—	12	11
Status of 1	12	11	10

On Panic: If Lee panics, then orders are to be immediately issued to all Confederate troops to withdraw off the west or south map edges along the trails, roads, or pikes. These orders are automatically accepted on arrival. If the Brock Road off the south map edge is open, troops may use it to withdraw. The Confederate player gets 1 strategic victory point for each un-wrecked division which exits via the Brock Road route.

Panic Demands: Lee may make two panic demands each day. He may direct each demand at Grant, Meade or Burnside as he wishes, but only against one of the three at a time.