Across A Deadly Field: The War in the East thumbnail

Across A Deadly Field: The War in the East

Across A Deadly Field: The War in the East Rulebook

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Eastern Terrain Definitions and Effects

The Illusion of Scale

For all the scenarios in this book, the size of the grid squares on the scenario maps are defined by the figure scale that is being used as follows:

For 6mm or 10mm figures each map square is 12 inches across and each game board inch is about 100 to 120 yards.

For 15mm or 20mm figures each map square is 18 inches across and each game board inch is about 80 to 100 yards.

For 25mm or 28mm figures each map square is 24 inches across and each game board inch is about 60 to 80 yards.

All miniature wargames are an abstraction to some degree and many things are out-of-scale. There is a constant debate of how close to the ground scale should the vertical scale be and should the buildings be in scale with the ground scale or in scale with the figures. No matter how rigorous is the terrain replication, the game board will inevitably be a compromise, but it should be a compromise that creates the illusion that all elements are in scale with each other – even if they are not. Our miniature wargame tables are, at best, an illusion of a historical battle and that illusion will not suffer with more or less abstractions provided the level of abstraction is consistent within each specific scenario or battle.

Modeling the Terrain

Scale and Elevation

Most of the game boards for the Eastern Theater battles have from one to six relative elevations with each elevation change representing approximately 20 to 30 feet of elevation difference. For example, the First Day of Gettysburg scenario boards have five elevation "Levels", starting with "Level 1" and going up to a "Level 5" as indicated below. On that specific board, the top of Barlow's Knoll (Level 3) is roughly two elevation levels lower than where the Mummasburg Road crosses Oak Hill (level 5) and historically there was about a 60 foot elevation difference between the two points. Some individual aspects of a battlefield's terrain will often be unique and will require special rules. That, however, should not be considered a problem as "quirky terrain" – such as the "Devil's Den" at Gettysburg — often imparts a unique tactical aspect when recreating a specific historical battlespace.

When modeling the terrain,

The rolling hills north of Gettysburg were typical of many of the eastern battlefields in Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and the Carolinas

it is not necessary to portray each indicated level on the gaming board exactly as they are presented on the scenario map. Consider the scenario maps as guidelines that show which slopes were somewhat steeper than others and which hills were generally higher than others. Depending on the degree of replication or abstraction that is desired just about any terrain modeling technique will work as long as the overall impression of the battlefield is presented in a generally consistent manner.

Elevation and Going up Slope

With the exception of some of some steep river banks or abrupt slopes, most of the hills in these eastern scenarios were gentle rolling slopes that troops could easily go up or down without too much extra effort. However, there were always some significant exceptions. For instance, northwest of Gettysburg the east slope of Oak Hill was much steeper than the west slope. Consequently, there is no extra movement penalty for troops going up or down a slope unless the unit is moving up a "steep" slope which is defined as going up a three elevation differences in one action as follows.

If a unit is moving up two different elevation levels or their equivalent during any one movement action, then the movement rate is done at one terrain type worse than it normally would be. For example, should a unit be moving through "Light Woods" and going up a slope of two elevation differences, that movement would be done at the "Heavy Woods" movement rate.

Elevation and Line of Sight

There are two major scenery modeling techniques that wargamers use when portraying elevation differences and for determining the impact of intervening hills, knolls, or other sight blocking objects such as farms or woods. One is the "contoured terrain" method, where each of the major game elevation contours is portrayed as a distinct level so that there is no debate as to which elevation a unit is on, and who might be able to fire over whom. The other approach, known as "flex terrain" is where the gaming surface is portrayed with a thin flexible rug or the equivalent so as to create model terrain with gently rolling hills and valleys that seamlessly blend together. Nevertheless, given the fact that even the smaller 6mm or 10mm figures are greatly out of scale with most wargame ground scales, significant abstraction is usually necessary in simulating the Line-of-Sight (LOS) impact of the miniature terrain no matter which modeling method is used.

Contoured terrain can either be made with layers of stryofoam cut roughly to the shape as the actual terrain contours so as to make a permanent miniature board of the historical terrain or it can take the shape of removable individual hills that approximate the shape of the desired hills — which then can be used for other scenarios.

The contour terrain method makes it very easy to determine which units are on a slope and which are not. Depending on the scenario, the sloping hill that the two Confederate brigades are attacking could be plausibly defined as either a Level Two or Level Three Hill.

If contoured terrain is used, then the First Day of Gettysburg terrain map, with its five indicated levels can serve as a general guide for the respective heights and slopes of the different levels. With that in mind, the diagram and table below should be taken as a relative guide to the terrain and how elevation differences impact a unit's LOS rather than as a strict elevation definition of each level being so many feet high. In scaling these "levels" to the wargame table, assume that one "level" of terrain corresponds to roughly the height of most farm buildings and orchards, while light woods are twice that and heavy woods are triple that – and this will look even better if the buildings used are one scale less than the figures – so, if you wargame with 25mm or 28mm figures consider using 15mm buildings, as they will look just as good and their "footprint" will be closer in scale to the ground scale.

The sharp edges of contour terrain pieces can be disguised by spreading flocking along the edges that is used on the terrain pieces themselves.

Since the vertical scale is almost always exaggerated on a typical wargame table, a case can be made for using the lower ½ inch per each level even for the larger 15mm sized figures – it all depends on personal preference and the terrain effect you are trying to capture.

The below hill guidelines assume that each 6mm/10mm "level" is approximately ½ inch, each 15mm/20mm level is about 3/4 inch and each 25mm/28mm level is about 1 inch. However, given the wide variety in the height of even "standardized" figure heights, it is quite possible that for any given wargame table, a different elevation value per level might look better. For example, for 15mm figures use either ½ per level or ¾ inch per level, whichever looks better to you.

ADF – ET Elevation Levels

So, a unit on the top of Herr Ridge (Level 4) could see, to some degree, over farms, orchards and light woods, but heavy woods would hide anything behind them. However, even if a unit is higher than a potential "blocking object" and could technically see over it, the area directly behind such an "object" would still have a "shadow" area or "dead ground" that would not be visible. And even a small stretch of "dead ground" can have a significant tactical effect, as in the Battle of Piedmont scenario. As might be expected, taller objects would have a larger "shadow" than a shorter objects and a high hill has a longer shadow than a low hill. A rough guide to this shadow effect for contoured terrain is suggested on the table below.

Line-of-Sight Shadow Effect

For example, in the previous diagram should a 15mm battery on Seminary Ridge (Level 3) want to fire at a target just beyond the orchard, it could only do so if the target was more than two inches beyond the edge of the orchard, because if it was closer than two inches from the orchard's edge, the LOS "shadow" of the orchard would prevent the battery from seeing it.

If flex-terrain is used, a pliable gaming surface such as a thin rug with all the major terrain areas painted or flocked onto it, can be draped over various shapes of approximately the correct heights to create the impression of gentle rolling hills that seamlessly flow into each other. Flex terrain has the visual advantage that the resulting terrain has more natural undulations which are typical of the Virginia, Pennsylvania and Maryland countryside — which saw the vast majority of the eastern fighting.

Flex terrain mimics the subtle slopes of many a civil war battlefield

Flex-terrain can have the disadvantage that it can be more difficult to determine which relative level a unit might be on or to easily discern if a certain battery can fire over a specific battle line. However, as illustrated below, a "same sized" dice or "standardized" block — perhaps equal to the equivalent of one level — can be used to indicate a standard "target height" or "object height". Then a long ruler or straight edge is laid from the top of the "shooter's block", across the intervening object or hill and to the intended "target block" to determine the "shadow area". If the ruler or straight edge can touch the top of the shooter's block and the target's block then the shooter has a legal LOS. In the example below, the small knoll blocks visibility to target "A", but not to target "B" so, a "hilltop battery" could see and fire on target "B". To determine LOS over other blocking terrain such as a farm complex or light woods, small standardized blocks could be fashioned to indicate the relative true game height of each of these objects and used in the same manner to determine which blocking terrain can be seen over and which cannot.

Elevation and Visibility Distance: On a 19th century battlefield obscured with the dust of thousands of men, animals and dense layers of black powder smoke, holding the high ground could give units a distinct visibility advantage. Technological advances in the effective range of rifled artillery could be largely negated if targets could not be seen and identified. But, even a modest height advantage could enable experienced commanders and gunners to see over the smoky chaos and engage targets at much longer ranges than was practical in earlier wars. The visibility advantage of Cemetery Hill was probably one of the main reason the Union would eventually put 12 batteries hub-to-hub along its crest and while Big Round Top was certainly the highest point on the battlefield, it had questionable military value since it was covered with heavy woods which tended to nullify much of its potential visibility advantage. The following table shows the visibility advantage of the high ground and how far a unit can see from each of the different elevation levels.

For all the scenarios listed here unless specified otherwise, morning is up to and including the 12:00 noon turn and afternoon is from 12:30 PM up to and including the 7:00 PM Turn. All turns from the 7:30 PM turn on are considered as night turns.

If a unit wishes to fire at an enemy unit that is beyond visibility, it can still do so – but, it would be considered to be "area fire" and would cost the shooter one less die. It is certainly possible that an artillery battery on higher ground (level 3, 4 or 5) than an opposing artillery battery on lower ground (Level 1 or 2) would have full visibility while the battery on the lower elevation would be forced to fire back with "area fire" and consequently would be rolling one less die than its opposing battery on the higher ground. In such a case, the guns on the high ground would definitely have an advantage. The height or visibility advantage would certainly have been one possible factor on the afternoon of July 2 at Gettysburg, when combined Confederate gun battalions on Benner's Hill attempted to engage the Union batteries on Cemetery Hill – a somewhat higher position. After about two hours, it became clear that the Federal gunners were winning and the Confederates began to withdraw their guns off Benner's Hill.

Terrain Details

Given the large ground scale of Across a Deadly Field, a better battlefield impression is usually created if the buildings are at least one size smaller than the figure size. If using 15mm figures where one inch is about 80 to 100 yards, 10mm or even 6mm buildings often have a "footprint" that is closer to consistency with the game's ground scale than would most 15mm buildings. Also, Across a Deadly Field does not recommend trying to model every building in a farm complex; but, rather suggests that the "farm area" be defined by a fenced in area with a single "farm like" building. This will define where a "farm area" is and where it is not — while still leaving plenty of room for the figures. Our miniature wargame tables are, at best, an illusion of a historical battle and that illusion will not suffer with more or less abstractions provided the level of abstraction is consistent within each specific scenario or battle.

Here a Union brigade of four regiments defends a fenced farm area.

If a unit is in a built-up farm area – an enclosed fenced area with a building in it – the target unit gets a -1 DRM from artillery fire and a -3 DRM from infantry fire – but no "additional" benefit from the surrounding fences. Units in a farm area do receive the -1 MMP cover morale benefit for being in cover against all fires. LOS extends into a farm or orchard area, but not through it.

When firing out from within a farm or town area a unit's FPs are halved unless the unit is exactly on the edge – as in this picture – against a unit outside the farm area.

A typical Gettysburg light woods where General Reynolds was killed.

Light and Heavy Woods: Eastern woods could either be light woods or heavy woods with the difference usually being determined by the proximity of the woods to active farm areas. When the wooded areas were adjacent or near the farms, the domestic animals were often left to wander through them to seek shade from the summer sun and to graze on the grasses and brush under the trees. The net result was that over a few seasons, the understory of the forest would be cleaned out while the farmers themselves would chop down the smaller trees for fence rails and fire wood. And with the understory thinned or cleared out, movement was easier and visibility was better. The heavier woods were usually in areas that were too wild, rugged or steep for the animals to graze and consequently the understory often became a tangle of small trees and tough vines.

The tangled heavy woods on Culps' Hill at Gettysburg. The dark spots on the trees are where they were struck by musket balls fired by the upslope Union troops.

Visibility determination is different for heavy and light woods. Units on the outside of heavy woods can only see a target if it is on the edge of the heavy woods. However, units on the outside of light woods can see into one inch of light woods. If two opposing units are in heavy woods they can only see up to one inch through the woods. However, they could still do area fire in heavy woods out to a maximum distance of two inches. If two opposing units are in light woods, roll a 1D6 for visibility before each fire and that is the visibility in inches – up to a maximum of three inches – or up to a maximum of four inches for area fire in light woods. If two opposing units are in heavy woods, the procedure is the same except the all distances are defined as "half inches" with a maximum visibility for heavy woods being one inch or two inches for area fire. For both heavy and light woods of any size, there is no visibility completely through the woods to an opposing unit on the opposite side of the woods.

The Eastern Roads

In the rural east, such as around Gettysburg and Antietam, there were two road types — the main macadam or gravel roads and the many smaller farm roads that were usually dirt. And the more rural was the area, the more the dirt roads were the norm. The main roads were usually bordered by heavy rail and post fences and were named, though the names could vary depending on location. For game purposes the main – or "named roads" – should be treated as "roads" for movement and the "farm roads" should use the "trail" movement category.

A Multitude of Fences

Many areas of eastern agricultural areas had wooden fences of every possible type and based on best historical estimates the scenario maps indicate their most likely locations. Some agricultural areas such as those in Pennsylvania seemed to have fence everywhere; other areas, such as some of the more rural Virginia areas had much less. In any case, it is not necessary to model each and every fence. As noted, the heavier wood fences were usually found along the "named" Roads and Pikes — such as the Chambersburg Pike — and should you have a limited model fence inventory, those should be simulated first. The lighter split rail fences were commonly used around the individual fields and farms, and an acceptable representation of the fenced fields of Gettysburg could be accomplished by simply modeling every other fence. In any case, the "fence rules" are as follows:

Across a Deadly Field – ET Heavy Fence

Crossing Fences

Any movement across one or more fences or stone walls is done at the broken terrain movement rate. If limbered artillery or an infantry column crosses any fence or stone wall, a "gap" in the fence is immediately created at that point. If a unit in line or extended line – not skirmishers — crosses a light wood fence it is assumed they have knocked it down as they crossed. A heavy wood fence or a stone wall, however, has to be climbed over at the broken terrain rate and it is assumed to remain, unless a gap was created by a column of infantry, cavalry or limbered artillery as noted above.

Orchards

The Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania farmers loved their orchards and while some were bigger than others it was a rare farm that didn't have even a small one.

The lighter stacked split rail fences could easily be knocked down.

Indeed, many orchards would become famous as the focal point of a particular struggle such as the peach Orchards at Shiloh or on the second day of Gettysburg.

Orchards are treated as broken terrain for movement and block Line-of-Sight (LOS) if a unit is trying to see completely through them. Orchards, however, have no LOS impediment to seeing into them. Orchards provide a -1 DRM target benefit from infantry fire; but, no benefit from artillery fire. Any unit in an orchard is entitled to the -1 MMP cover morale benefit against infantry fire, but not from artillery fire.

The Eastern Battles – Optional Rules

Introduction

The following additional rules can be applied to any ADF scenario and highlight a particular tactical nuance of the civil war battlefield. While there is solid historical evidence for each of these rules their use can add additional complexity or may alter play balance for some of the scenarios and consequently they should be treated as optional rules that should be used only by mutual agreement by the players.

Unequal Stands

The basic rules for ADF have each regiment represented by two stands, each with the same number of figures, so that all units would be depleted at 50% casualties. However, for gamers that prefer to more accurately model specific regiments where the actual strength is known, a more accurate figure representation can be accommodated by not requiring that each stand have the same number of pictures. For example, a 420 man regiment would be most accurately represented by a total of seven figures – one stand of four figures and one stand of three figures. If this is done, losses should be taken as follows.

If a regiment has unequal stands and it is an elite or veteran regiment, then losses are first taken on the stand with the most figures to show the greater resilience of these units. But, if that regiment is a trained or green regiment than its first losses should be taken against the stand with the least number of figures, to show the greater fragility of less experienced units. Adapting this rule, however, tends to exaggerate the "staying power" of elite and/or veteran regiments verses trained and/or green regiments.

Variable Arrival Time

In any scenario where a specific arrival or entry time is indicated, that is the historical entry time as best as can be determined considering that even "reliable" historical sources often recorded significantly different times for the same events. And there is always the possibility that an aggressive commander would have hurried his troops to the sound of the guns or, more likely, became a victim of unexpected traffic jams, confusion, or the always present frictions of war. To add those possibilities, use the following rule.

At the start of the scenario roll a 1D6 for each arriving unit one turn before its scheduled arrival. If a "1" is rolled then the unit comes in one turn earlier than scheduled – right now. If a "2, 3 or 4" is rolled it comes in exactly as scheduled. If a "5 or 6" is rolled it comes in one turn later than originally scheduled. If there is a scheduled arrival sequence of brigades – such as Early's Confederate division — coming in at the same location, but sequenced one turn apart, roll once for the whole division to determine if the whole "sequence" is one turn early, on time, or delayed by one turn.

Extreme Disengagement

The standard disengagement rule allows a unit to retreat with a double disorder move out of harm's way with the firer losing one die and the retreating unit drops one morale level. This rule assumes that the regimental commander is attempting to maintain some level of control of his regiment as they pull back. However, sometimes the situation has become so extreme that the disengagement becomes outright flight. Such was the case of Colonel Jesse Appler and the 53rd Ohio in the early hours of the Battle of Shiloh. After having repulsed two determined attacks by the 13th Tennessee, Appler suddenly lost his nerve and ordered, "Retreat and save yourselves!" And run they did with most of the regiment dissolving into a fleeing herd that was not seen until the next day. To use this option, use the following rule.

If an infantry or cavalry unit wishes to simply run, it may make an "extreme disengagement". To do so, it retreats with a triple disorder move and all fire against it still losses one die. However, it ends its movement at two morale levels lower than when it began – but, never worse than routed. Hence, a good order unit will end as shaken unit; but, all others will end as a routed unit. As with a normal disengagement, an extreme disengagement can be done as an action or a reaction. If an artillery unit uses this option, it obviously would abandon its guns, so it would be removed.

Road Column Under Fire

Being in the wrong formation at the wrong time made even the best troops very nervous. One of the more unsettling conditions was being caught under fire while in a road column. By late 1862, even if a new politically appointed brigade or division commander – or a new wargamer – did not know better, the regimental commanders and the soldiers themselves almost certainly did. To reflect their inherent battlefield awareness, incorporate this rule:

If a unit in road column comes under any fire that results in a morale check — regardless of whether the unit passes the morale check or not — that road column must immediately stop and use its next action or reaction to change formation into either a battle line or an extended line facing the enemy. If it was moving as part of its second action and consequently would not have an action left — it simply stops and must use its next reaction to change into a battle line or extended line.

Continuous Movement

The movement distances for ADF take into account the extra time it might take for the commanders to evaluate a situation, decide what they wanted to do and have their orders clearly understood by their subordinates – all of which adds to operational delay. However, if all a regiment did was to move as fast as it could and that was clearly understood at the start of its "actions" and it did not stop to fire, reform and received no hostile fire during its continued movement…then it could go somewhat further than the "normal" distance for its two ADF actions. For example, on the first day of Gettysburg at about 3:00 PM Hay's Brigade of Early's Confederate Division came on the field and was unopposed. Early give him the order to keep advancing and not to stop until he impacted the Federals. Hay's and his brigade did just that, rushed forward in extended order and about an hour and 4,000 yards later his somewhat winded, but exhilarated brigade along with Avery's Brigade slammed into Coster's Union Brigade and routed it just outside of Gettysburg at the brickyard. If continuous movement is allowed, adopt the following rules.

At the end of an hour Hay's Brigade covered about 4000 yards and would be part of joint attack that would drive Coster's Brigade out of the "brickyard".

Only veteran or elite active units or unit groups in good order may use continuous movements. At the start of its active turn, if a unit or unit group declares that for the its next two actions, it is doing nothing else — no firing, no formation change, no charge and is not forced to make a morale check of any kind – it gets an extra action of movement. However, it ends its turn in disorder and must roll a 1D6 for "stragglers". If the unit is forced to take any morale check while doing this, it does not get the extra movement, but still ends its turn in disorder and still must roll a 1D6 for "stragglers". Units in disorder or worse cannot use continuous movement.

Stragglers

If called for by the scenario or if any unit uses continuous movement, that unit must roll a 1D6 at the end of its final movement for stragglers in addition to now being in disorder. The number rolled with a 1D6 is the number of stragglers it has and the rolled 1D6 die is placed by the unit to indicate how many stragglers it now has. Elite Units modify this roll by "-1" and Green Units add a "+1" to the roll. This is a temporary reduction in the unit's figure count; but, until the stragglers are recovered those figure losses are treated as "real" and negatively impact both a unit's Firepower Points (FPs) and its Basic Modified Morale Point (BMP) if that the number of stragglers has caused the unit to lose a stand and reduced it to a depleted status.

Straggling Penalties:

If a unit with stragglers chooses to fire, its FPs are reduced by the number of "stragglers" it currently has. If a "straggled unit" is forced to take a morale check and the number of its stragglers has temporarily reduced it to less than one stand's worth of figures, the unit takes that specific morale check as a depleted unit. If a unit suffers casualties while it still has "stragglers" and if the combined straggler loss, previous losses and current fire loss is equal to or more than the figures the unit originally had – that unit is assumed to have disintegrated and is removed from the game. If a unit routs while still having stragglers, the "temporary" straggler figure loss is converted to a permanent figure loss.

Recovering Stragglers

To recover its stragglers, a disordered unit reforms back to good order by spending its upcoming "reaction" to "reform", after which it would be in good order and would have recovered all its stragglers. If the unit did not use its reaction to reform, it could use one of its upcoming "actions" to reform and recover its stragglers. If a shaken unit has stragglers, it must first rally to good order and only after that is done, is it assumed to have recovered its stragglers as soon as it has rallied and reformed to good order.

Artillery Battery Withdrawal

Experienced artillery crews learned that a risky, but often effective way of pulling out of a difficult situation was to fire a full battery salvo and then while its position was temporally covered with their own smoke, quickly limber and rapidly pull out. As with many such clever tactical expedients, sometimes it worked and sometimes it did not. To offer artillery batteries this option, use the following optional rule.

Only veteran and elite batteries – not green or trained — may fire and then spend half a movement to limber and then take a half limbered moved away from the enemy, while covered by their own smoke. Such a move must be declared prior to doing it and can only be done as a combined two action – fire & limber/move — turn. If so declared, any fire directed against the battery as it limbers and withdraws gets neither the -3 DRM benefit for being unlimbered or the DRM penalties for being limbered. Any fire directed against the battery while this is being done is a "dead even" shot with no DRM benefits or penalties. If one hit is scored against the retiring battery, the first hit is considered to be a horse hit. If two hits are scored against the retiring battery then it is resolved as one horse hit and one section destroyed.

Artillery Fire Over Infantry

Once the lines were established and if the terrain permitted it, the preferred Union defense was infantry up front along with a battery in direct support – usually Napoleons – to deliver point blank canister fire into any attacking infantry. This would be supplemented with other artillery batteries – usually rifles – firing over the heads of the infantry with solid shot, shell or case shot so as to break-up the attacking formations before they reached musket range. The Union batteries, having more reliable ammunition then their opponents, were consistently more comfortable firing over the heads of their own troops than were their Confederate counterparts. The rules for this are as follows.

Union artillery can do non-canister fire over the heads of friendly units if the battery or the targeted unit is at least one elevation higher than the intervening friendly unit provided that both the firing battery and the targeted unit are at least two inches from the intervening friendly unit. Confederate batteries can also fire over friendly units in the same manner, but either the battery or the target must be at least two elevations higher than the intervening friendly unit and both the firing battery and the targeted unit have to be at least three inches from the intervening friendly unit.

Optional Canister Exception

While canister was very seldom fired over the heads of friendly infantry, it was occasionally done when in desperate situations. In the final defense of Seminary Ridge, Steven's' battery of six Napoleons would fire 57 rounds of canister directly over the heads of the 2nd and 7th Wisconsin less than 80 yards away on the down slope. While the effect was staggering against the attacking Confederates, it also had an unsettling effect on the Union infantry underneath this canister storm. Lieutenant Colonel John Callis of the 7th Wisconsin claimed that he tried unsuccessfully to get the battery to stop as it was killing some of his own men.

Long range canister – but, not point blank canister – may be fired over the heads of friendly infantry per all the regular rules for firing over friendly infantry. But, every time this is done the intervening friendly infantry must take a "fired-on-rear" by artillery (+4 to MMP) morale check. In any case, Union artillery can only do this if it has one elevation advantage and Confederate artillery must continue to have a two elevation advantage.

Leader Benefit Differentiation

Usually, if a leader is adjacent to a unit, his ability to improve movement and morale depends solely on his leader benefit (LB) which can be converted to extra inches of movement or a beneficial Modified Morale Point (MMP). If and only if a leader is actually attached to a unit, will that unit get a beneficial firing die roll modifier (DRM). However, a case can be made, that the ability of a leader to offer these benefits may actually depend on how involved he was with his brigade and or one particular regiment. For example, just being seen nearby would probably be enough to bolster a unit's sagging more. But, to actually improve a regiment's firing might require his personal direction. So, to more precisely reflect these nuances, use the following rules.

Extra Movement

If a leader is adjacent to any one regiment and if all the regiments of that brigade are contiguously adjacent to each other when they move as a unit group, they would all get extra inches of movement equal to the leader's LB, provided the regiments remain adjacent to the leader or contiguously adjacent to a unit that is adjacent to him.

Morale Benefit

If a leader is physically adjacent to a regiment, that regiment receives an MMP modifier equal to his leadership bonus. Depending on the actual unit configurations, it is possible that up to two adjacent regiments could receive this morale benefit.

Firing Benefit

If and only if, a leader is attached to a particular regiment can his LB be used to improve that specific unit's firing as a beneficial DRM equal to the leader's LB. A leader can only benefit the firing of one unit or the combined firing of adjacent units. However, the total combined FPs firing are still limited to 18 FPs for artillery, 16 FPs for infantry, and 14 FPs for cavalry.

Artillery Firing Benefit

All artillery leaders have an "LB" which can help morale and extra limbered movement – not unlimbered movement – only if an artillery leader has a specific (1 Arty LB) can he benefit the artillery firing of a battery or battery group.

Leader Reaction

In most cases, a unit's legal reactions are limited to firing, reforming, rallying, and with some restrictions, a countercharge. However, moving is usually not a legal reaction. However, if a brigade or higher leader was attached to a unit and became involved in leading an individual regiment or contiguous brigade its ability to quickly react would probably be improved. To reflect this capability, incorporate the following optional rule.

If a brigade or higher leader with at least a "+1 LB" is attached to a specific unit, that one unit or designated unit group may make a disordered move or a disordered charge as a legal reaction. That said, there still must be a legal reaction "trigger" of a visible enemy action or an invisible enemy unit within two inches. Even if the unit cannot see it the unit triggering the reaction, if its brigade, division or corps leader is adjacent and can see the enemy movement, he could order the reaction movement.

Area Fire

Any time there is a legitimate disagreement as to if a unit can see another or if the visibility could be defined as obscured, then firing can still be allowed as, "area fire" which is done as any other fire, but with one less die.